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“Infringed” Versus “Infringing”:  Different 
Interpretations of the Word “Work” and the Effect on 
the Deterrence Goal of Copyright Law 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the key elements that courts use to determine an appropriate 
statutory damage award in a copyright infringement case is the number 
of infringements of a copyright.1  In most cases, the number of 
infringements of a copyright is obvious.  For example, if a publishing 
company reprints an author’s copyrighted book without her permission, 
the author is entitled to one statutory damage award.  Similarly, if a 
recording company includes one of a composer’s copyrighted songs 
without his permission on an album, the composer is entitled to one 
statutory damage award.  But how does a court determine the number 
of infringements when one infringing article has been printed six times 
in over one hundred copies of a magazine?  Or when one infringing 
song has been played by a network radio six times over one hundred 
stations?  When computing statutory damages in the above scenarios, 
does a court count one infringement, six infringements, or one hundred 
infringements?  The answer depends on the court’s interpretation of the 
word “work” in § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act):  
“[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to recover . . . an award of 
statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with 
respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable 
individually.”2  Clearly in the above scenarios, a court’s decision 
concerning the number of infringements of a copyright strongly impacts 
the amount of the statutory damage award.3 
Before the 1976 Act went into effect, many courts adhered to the 
“multiplicity doctrine” and would have awarded statutory damages in 
the above scenarios for each of the six times that the infringing article 
was printed or the infringing song was played.4  Post–1976, however, 
 
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000). 
2. Id. (emphasis added). 
3. For example, assuming that a judge awards $1000 per infringement, the difference in 
interpretations of the word “work” is $5000; that is, $1000 for one infringed work compared 
to $6000 for the six infringing works. 
4. See Peter Thea, Statutory Damages for the Multiple Infringement of a Copyrighted 
Work:  A Doctrine Whose Time Has Come, Again, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 463, 474–75 
ZAWADA ARTICLE - FORMATTED 4/24/2006  6:52:27 AM 
130 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1 
 
most courts have interpreted the 1976 Act’s language as abolishing the 
practice of awarding statutory damages for each infringing work, instead 
awarding statutory damages for each infringed work.5  In 2004, the First 
Circuit reaffirmed this interpretation in Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux 
Records.6  Although the law may appear to be well-settled, two 
questions remain.  First, does this interpretation of the 1976 Act actually 
deter prospective infringers—one of the goals of copyright law?  And, 
second, does this interpretation promote good public policy?  Evidence 
seems to suggest that the answers to both of these questions are in the 
negative. 
 This Comment, beginning with Part II, gives a brief history of 
statutory damages in the United States from the Copyright Act of 1790 
(1790 Act), through the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act), to § 504(c)(1) 
of the 1976 Act.  Part III discusses the ambiguous language in the 1909 
Act, the confusion that resulted in the courts, and the birth of the 
multiplicity doctrine.  Part IV discusses the revisions under § 504(c)(1) 
of the 1976 Act and the cases that have interpreted the revisions as an 
abolition of the multiplicity doctrine.  Finally, Part V discusses how the 
multiplicity doctrine furthers the deterrence goal of copyright law while 
promoting good public policy and suggests that courts return to the 
interpretation of the 1976 Act that awards statutory damages for each 
infringing work. 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATUTORY DAMAGES FOR COPYRIGHT 
OWNERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 Common law remedies originally compensated copyright owners 
for copyright infringement.7  Victims of copyright infringement were 
entitled only to actual damages and profits.8  Over time, however, 
England and many American colonies adopted statutory damage 
 
(1988) (noting the courts’ shift from basing statutory damage awards on the number of 
infringing works to the number of infringed works); see also infra Part III.A. (discussing the 
multiplicity doctrine in more detail). 
5. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 14.04[E][2][a] (2005) (“Prima facie [the post–1976 interpretations] would appear to 
represent a departure from the case law under the 1909 Act, whereby a separate set of 
statutory damages (each with its own $250 minimum) was applied to what might be termed 
each infringing transaction undertaken by the same defendant.”); see also infra Part IV 
(discussing the infringed work interpretation of the 1976 Act in more detail). 
6. 370 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2004). 
7. See Thea, supra note 4, at 470; see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654–
57 (1834); Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 206 (K.B.). 
8. See Thea, supra note 4, at 470 n.32. 
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provisions to address the problem that arose when the amount of actual 
damages and lost profits caused by a copyright infringement was too 
difficult to determine.9  These statutory damage provisions consist of a 
series of three acts:  (1) the 1790 Act,10 (2) the 1909 Act,11 and (3) the 
1976 Act.12 
A.  1790 Act 
 The first federal copyright statute was the 1790 Act, modeled 
after England’s Statute of Anne.13  The 1790 Act was the first statute 
that “specifically . . . recognize[d] the rights of authors and the 
foundation of subsequent legislation on the subject of copyright.”14  
Over the nineteenth century, scattered pieces of legislation slowly 
expanded remedies available to copyright owners.15  These pieces of 
legislation were finally consolidated in 1909 into a single act.16 
B.  1909 Act 
Under the 1909 Act, copyright owners in infringement actions had 
the option of choosing “in lieu of actual damages and profits, such 
damages as to the court shall appear just.”17  In addition, the 1909 Act 
 
9. See id. 
10. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
11. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000). 
13. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 21, § 1 (Eng.).  Under the Statute of Anne, 
copyright owners were entitled to specific amounts of damages for each infringing copy.  Id.  
Authors had the right to print books for fourteen years, and infringers were forced to pay one 
penny per infringing sheet.  Id.  Under the 1790 Act, copyright infringers were forced to pay 
fifty cents per infringing sheet.  Copyright Act of 1790.  In addition, infringers were “liable to 
suffer and pay to the . . . author or proprietor all damages occasioned by such injury.”  Id. 
14. WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 4 (6th ed. 1986). 
15. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436–39 (protecting the copyrights of 
musical compositions); Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (protecting copyright 
owner’s performance and publication rights in dramatic works); Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 
194, 28 Stat. 965 (protecting copyrighted photographs not made from a work of fine art by 
providing for specific remedies); Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (protecting the 
copyrights of designs, engravings, and prints). 
16. See Copyright Act of 1909. 
17. Section 101(b) of the Copyright Act of 1909 further states, in relevant part: 
 To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor 
may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the 
infringer shall have made from such infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff 
shall be required to prove sales only, and the defendant shall be required to prove 
every element of cost which he claims, or in lieu of actual damages and profits, such 
damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and assessing such damages the court 
may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, but in case of a 
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provided that two separate infringements of the same copyrighted work 
would result in two separate claims for minimum damages.18  Thus, 
copyright infringers were liable to copyright owners for each infringing 
act of each copyrighted work.19  First, however, a court “had to 
determine whether the infringer’s acts constituted ‘multiple’ 
infringements, to each of which a statutory minimum award would 
attach, or continuous infringements (of the original act of infringement), 
to which only one statutory award would attach.”20  In addition, the 1909 
Act set out four “yardstick provisions,” that is, guidelines for a court to 
use at its discretion when calculating statutory damages.21  One court 
interpreted these provisions as suggesting that “one ‘infringement’ may 
 
newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph, such damages shall not 
exceed the sum of $200 nor be less than the sum of $50, and in the case of the 
infringement of an undramatized or nondramatic work by means of motion pictures, 
where the infringer shall show that he was not aware that he was infringing, and that 
such infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen, such damages shall not 
exceed the sum of $100; and in the case of an infringement of a copyrighted 
dramatic or dramatico-musical work by a maker of motion pictures and his agencies 
for distribution thereof to exhibitors, where such infringer shows that he was not 
aware that he was infringing a copyrighted work, and that such infringements could 
not reasonably have been foreseen, the entire sum of damages recoverable by the 
copyright proprietor from such infringing maker and his agencies for the distribution 
to exhibitors of such infringing motion picture shall not exceed the sum of $5,000 
nor be less than $250, and such damages shall in no other case exceed the sum of 
$5,000 nor be less than the sum of $250, and shall not be regarded as a penalty. But 
the foregoing exceptions shall not deprive the copyright proprietor of any other 
remedy given him under this law, nor shall the limitation as to the amount of 
recovery apply to infringements occurring after the actual notice to a defendant, 
either by service of process in a suit or other written notice served upon him. 
 First.  In the case of a painting, statute, or sculpture, $10 for every infringing 
copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or 
employees; 
 Second.  In the case of any work enumerated in section 5 of this title, except a 
painting, statute, or sculpture, $1 for every infringing copy made or sold by or found 
in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees; 
 Third.  In the case of a lecture, sermon, or address, $50 for every infringing 
delivery; 
 Fourth.  In the case of a dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or orchestral 
composition, $100 for the first and $50 for every subsequent infringing performance; 
in the case of other musical compositions, $10 for every infringing performance[.] 
Copyright Act of 1909 § 101(b). 
18. See id. 
19. See id. 
20. Thea, supra note 4, at 468. 
21. See Copyright Act of 1909 § 101(b).  For example, one of the guidelines 
recommends that a defendant pay ten dollars for every infringing copy of a painting, statue, 
or sculpture.  Another guideline recommends that a defendant pay fifty dollars for every 
“infringing delivery” of a lecture, sermon, or address.  Id. 
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nevertheless result in more than one ‘performance’ and that in fixing 
damages for such infringement between the $250 minimum and the 
$5000 maximum, the court may consider the number of infringing 
performances and the suggested yardstick amount for each one.”22 
 Although the 1909 Act consolidated scattered pieces of copyright 
legislation into a single act, it was so problematic that one judge 
described it as “an ambiguous hodgepodge of improvisations.”23  As a 
result, the legislature revised the Copyright Act once again in 1976.24 
C.  1976 Act 
 The 1976 Act attempted to resolve the ambiguities surrounding 
the 1909 Act, particularly the damages provisions.25  Like the 1909 Act, 
the 1976 Act provides that a copyright owner can choose to recover 
statutory damages for copyright infringement in lieu of actual damages.26  
Unlike the 1909 Act, however, the 1976 Act provides that statutory 
damage awards include “all infringements involved in the action, with 
respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable 
individually.”27  The purpose of the 1976 Act’s statutory damage 
provision was to provide courts with direction when calculating 
statutory damage awards, thereby avoiding the confusion caused by the 
1909 Act.28  This language has still proven to be ambiguous, however, as 
 
22. Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
23. Id. at 331; see also PATRY, supra note 14, at 10. 
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000). 
25. See PATRY, supra note 14, at 12. 
26. Section 504(c)(1), states, in relevant part: 
 Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may 
elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual 
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in 
the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable 
individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, 
in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just. 
§ 504(c)(1). 
27. Id. (emphasis added). 
28. See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5777–78.  House Report 1476 states that the goals of the damage award provisions of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 are as follows: 
(1) to give the courts specific unambiguous directions concerning monetary awards, 
thus avoiding the confusion and uncertainty that have marked the present law on 
the subject, and, at the same time, (2) to provide the courts with reasonable latitude 
to adjust recovery to the circumstances of the case, thus avoiding some of the 
artificial or overly technical awards resulting from the language of the existing 
statute. 
Id. 
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post–1976 courts have interpreted the word “work” to mean both 
infringing works (allowing for statutory damage awards for multiple 
infringements of a copyrighted work),29 as well as infringed works 
(allowing for only one statutory damage award for each work 
infringed).30  In an effort to interpret the meaning of the 1976 Act, some 
frustrated courts have looked to its legislative history.31  Other courts 
have focused on public policies, such as restitution, reparation, and 
deterrence, when interpreting the 1976 Act.32  Despite the continuing 
ambiguity surrounding the 1976 Act, the growing trend among the 
courts, as exemplified by the First Circuit’s decision in Venegas-
Hernandez, has been to interpret the word “work” to mean infringed 
work, thereby abolishing the multiplicity doctrine.33 
 
29. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Larkin, 672 F. Supp. 531, 535 (D. Me. 1987) 
(awarding statutory damages based on the number of infringing performances of copyrighted 
music); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
114, 118–20 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (awarding statutory damages based on the number of infringing 
commercials, promotional items, and personal appearances by the defendants); Milene 
Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 n.14 (D.R.I. 1982) (awarding statutory 
damages for the infringement of copyrighted songs based on the number of infringing 
performances of those songs); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 
475 F. Supp. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (awarding statutory damages based on the number of 
infringing broadcasts of a copyrighted film). 
30. See, e.g., Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 186 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(awarding statutory damages based on the two infringed songs on sixteen different albums); 
Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (awarding statutory damages 
based on the two infringed copyrights of Mickey and Minnie Mouse in six different poses); 
RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (refusing to allow 
multiple statutory damage awards for both the infringed graphics for the recording and the 
recording itself). 
31. See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 161. 
Although . . . an award of minimum statutory damages may be multiplied if separate 
works and separately liable infringers are involved in the suit, a single award . . . is to 
be made “for all infringements involved in the action.”  A single infringer of a single 
work is liable for a single amount . . . , no matter how many acts of infringement are 
involved in the action and regardless of whether the acts were separate, isolated, or 
occurred in a related series. 
Id. 
32. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952); 
Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 651, 657 (2d Cir. 1978); 
United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1481 (S.D. Fla. 1983).  
See also Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 139 (E.D. Mich. 1979) 
(considering such factors as “the time interval between succeeding publications; whether 
separate transactions generated were the same or different parties involved[]; were there new 
business arrangements made for each successive publication; were the succeeding 
publications made in the same or different locales?”). 
33. See Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 186. 
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III.  CONFUSION IN THE COURTS SURROUNDING THE 1909 ACT 
The first Supreme Court case under the 1909 Act to recognize 
statutory damages for the multiple infringements of a copyrighted work 
was L.A. Westerman Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co.34 in 1919.  In this case, 
the Court held that the unauthorized publication of six copyrighted 
illustrations that appeared in two advertisements in a newspaper 
resulted in six separate claims for minimum statutory damages.35  In its 
decision, the Court emphasized the fact that two different advertisers 
had sponsored each of the two publications.36  However, the Court 
explicitly left open the question of whether, for purposes of computing 
minimum damages, multiple infringements would arise if the additional 
publications were “merely a continuation or repetition of the first.”37  As 
a result, lower courts followed both the infringing interpretation of the 
1909 Act and the infringed interpretation. 
A.  The Multiplicity Doctrine:  The “Infringing” Work Interpretation 
Under the 1909 Act 
 The multiplicity doctrine, which dictated that courts should award 
statutory damages for multiple infringements of a copyrighted work, 
grew out of the ambiguity surrounding the 1909 Act.38  Although the 
multiplicity doctrine allowed for larger statutory damage awards, the 
awards were not arbitrary.39  Instead, many courts used a combination of 
several factors to compute statutory damage awards, including (1) the 
gross revenues of the infringer’s business and the size of the infringer’s 
business,40 (2) the proximity in time of the repeated infringements and 
the heterogeneity of the infringements,41 and (3) the “willfulness” of the 
 
34. 249 U.S. 100 (1919). 
35. Id. at 105–06.  Five of the six illustrations were published once and the other one 
twice.  Id.  The two advertisements that used the same infringing illustration were done by 
different artists and were separated by twenty-six days.  Id. at 103. 
36. Id. at 105 (noting that “[b]y publishing their advertisements, the defendant 
participated in their independent infringements. . . . [W]e think the second publication of the 
illustration must be regarded as another and distinct case of infringement”). 
37. Id. at 106. 
38. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. 
39. See discussion infra Part III.A.1–3. 
40. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Larkin, 672 F. Supp. 531, 535 n.2 (D. Me. 1987) 
(considering the gross revenue from liquor and food sales at the infringer’s business when 
computing the amount of the statutory damage award); Burndy Eng’g Co. v. Penn-Union 
Elec. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 671, 672 (W.D. Pa. 1940) (considering the “general nature of [the] 
defendant’s business” and the gross sales when computing statutory damage award). 
41. See, e.g., Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1102–04 (2d Cir. 
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defendant’s infringements.42 
1.  Gross Sales of the Infringer’s Business and Size of the Infringer’s 
Business 
The greater the gross sales and size of the infringer’s business, the 
greater the need for a large statutory damage award to deter 
prospective infringers.  Courts that recognize this fact have awarded 
statutory damages based on the number of infringing acts under the 
multiplicity doctrine.43 
 For example, in the 1987 case Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Larkin,44 
the court took into account the size of the infringer’s business when it 
awarded statutory damages of $1500 for each of the nine infringing 
acts.45  The defendants, owners of a Portland restaurant and nightclub, 
had infringed the plaintiff’s exclusive public performance copyrights to 
several copyrighted musical compilations.46  When awarding statutory 
damages, the court noted that the gross revenue from liquor and food 
sales at the defendant’s business totaled $281,809.47  By doing so, the 
court implied that awarding statutory damages for each infringing act 
for a total of $13,500 would be more likely to deter the defendants from 
committing further acts of infringement than a single $1500 award.48 
 
1976) (considering that the forty-eight separate infringements were in different cities, as well 
as that each had a specific negotiated agreement and different financial terms); Iowa State 
Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 475 F. Supp. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(considering that nineteen months separated each infringement under the time test, as well as 
that the infringements that were closest together were “broadcast to different audiences 
during different parts of the day for different purposes”). 
42. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952) 
(holding that a large statutory damage award not only “compels restitution of profit and 
reparation for injury but also is designed to discourage wrongful conduct”); Lottie Joplin 
Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 651, 657 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that courts 
have “broad discretion to make awards which serve the recognized compensatory and 
deterrent objectives of the Act”); Hosp. for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 
516 F. Supp. 67, 72 (E.D. Va. 1980) (considering that the defendant had written, directed, and 
applied for the copyright for the play as well as obtained licenses to perform other musicals in 
the past in determining that the infringements were “willful”). 
43. See, e.g., Larkin, 672 F. Supp. at 535; Burndy Eng’g Co., 32 F. Supp. at 672. 
44. 672 F. Supp. 531 (D. Me. 1987). 
45. Id. at 535. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 535 n.2. 
48. Id. at 535.  The court stated that it is “guided by the purposes of the Copyright Act, 
which include restitution of wrongfully acquired gains to prevent unjust enrichment of the 
defendant, reparation for injury done to the plaintiff, and deterrence of further wrongful 
conduct by defendant and others.”  Id. 
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Similarly, in the 1940 case Burndy Engineering Co. v. Penn-Union 
Electric Corp.,49 the court took into account the “general nature of [the] 
defendant’s business” when it awarded statutory damages for each of 
the fourteen infringements contained in six separate printings of the 
defendant’s trade catalogues.50  In addition, the court took into account 
the defendant corporation’s gross sales of over $52,000 of items 
contained in the infringing printings of the trade catalogues when 
awarding statutory damages for each infringing act.51  In conjunction 
with the gross sales of the infringer’s business and the size of the 
infringer’s business, courts also consider the proximity in time of the 
repeated infringements and the heterogeneity of the infringements 
under the multiplicity doctrine. 
2.  Proximity in Time of the Repeated Infringements and Heterogeneity 
of the Infringements 
Other courts have used the “time” and the “heterogeneity” factors 
when computing statutory damage awards under the multiplicity 
doctrine.52  When considering the “time” factor, the court “looks to the 
proximity in time of repeated infringements in deciding whether to treat 
them as multiple infringements or as one continuing infringement.”53  
When considering the “heterogeneity” factor, the court “looks to 
differences between the advertisers, financial arrangements, locales, 
audiences, and other significant variables” in deciding whether to treat 
the infringements as multiple infringements or a continuing 
infringement.54 
Professor Nimmer has also noted that courts have consistently used 
“time” and “heterogeneity” as deciding factors in cases decided under 
the 1909 Act: 
[I]f the interval between succeeding publications is a matter of 
days, the courts were inclined to consider all such publications as 
part of a single infringing transaction, requiring but a single 
minimum damages award.  If the interval between succeeding 
publications was for a substantially longer period, then the courts 
 
49. 32 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Pa. 1940). 
50. Id. at 672. 
51. Id. 
52. See, e.g., Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1102–03 (2d Cir. 
1976); Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 475 F. Supp. 78, 82 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
53. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., 475 F. Supp. at 82. 
54. Id. 
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viewed each publication as giving rise to a separate claim for at 
least minimum damages.55 
The case that most clearly articulated the importance of the “time” and 
the “heterogeneity” factors in computing statutory damage awards was 
Iowa State University Research Foundation v. American Broadcasting 
Cos.56 in 1979. 
In Iowa State University Research Foundation, Iowa State brought an 
action for copyright infringement against American Broadcasting 
Companies (ABC), alleging that ABC had infringed its copyright on a 
student-produced film about Olympic wrestler Dan Gable by airing it 
on national television during ABC’s 1972 Olympic Games telecast.57  
While Iowa State argued that ABC had committed four separate acts of 
infringement,58 ABC argued that its various uses of the film constituted 
only one infringement.59  The court ultimately agreed with Iowa State, 
holding that “the time test alone mandates a finding of four separate 
infringements” because more than nineteen months separated each of 
the infringements.60  In addition, the court found four separate 
infringements under the “heterogeneity” test because those 
infringements which were “closest together in time were broadcast to 
different audiences during different parts of the day for different 
purposes.”61 
Similarly, the court considered the “time” and the “heterogeneity” 
factors when computing statutory damages in the 1976 case Robert 
 
55. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 14.04[E][2][a]. 
56. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., 475 F. Supp. at 82. 
57. Id. at 80. 
58. Iowa State argued that the four separate acts of infringement included the 
following: 
(1) [T]he initial copying of “Champion” in early August, 1972, for later use; (2) the 
broadcast of a seven-to-twelve second segment on August 25, 1972 as part of ABC’s 
Olympic preview; (3) the broadcast of a two and one-half minute segment on 
August 27 during ABC’s live Olympic coverage from Munich; and (4) the broadcast 




60. Id. at 82 (noting that “at least two days and as much as nineteen months separate 
each of these infringements from one another, the time test alone mandates a finding of four 
separate infringements”).  In addition, the court stated that “[i]n determining the number of 
times a defendant has infringed upon protected work, common sense provides the surest 
guide.”  Id. at 81–82. 
61. Id. at 82. 
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Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly.62  In this case, plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendants, Roman Catholic priests, infringed plaintiffs’ copyright 
by performing the rock opera “Jesus Christ Superstar” without a 
license.63  The Second Circuit held that the forty-eight infringing 
performances of the rock opera constituted forty-eight separate 
infringements because they were a “series of disconnected one-night or 
two-night stands in different cities.”64  In addition, each of the 
defendants’ performances was made after a separate, specific negotiated 
agreement, and each of the financial arrangements contained different 
terms.65  Although the court considered other tests,66 it ultimately 
decided that “when the components of the infringing activity are 
heterogeneous, the presumption is that each infringing activity is a 
separate infringement.”67  In addition to the gross sales of an infringer’s 
business, the size of an infringer’s business, the proximity in time of the 
repeated infringements, and the heterogeneity of the infringements, 
courts also consider the “willfulness” of the defendant’s infringements 
under the multiplicity doctrine. 
3.  The “Willfulness” of the Defendant’s Infringements 
Most courts considered the “willfulness” of the defendant’s 
infringements when computing statutory damage awards under the 
multiplicity doctrine because it was a factor articulated in the 1909 Act.68  
Plaintiffs can prove willfulness by showing either that the defendant 
actually knew that he or she was infringing the plaintiff’s copyright or 
recklessly disregarded the possibility that he or she might be infringing.69  
 
62. 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976). 
63. Id. at 1097. 
64. Id. at 1103. 
65. Id. 
66. See id. at 1102–03 (noting that it did “not conceive any reasonable test that would 
make the forty-eight United States performances but a single infringement”). 
67. Id. at 1103. 
68. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952); 
Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 651, 657 (2d Cir. 1978); Hosp. 
for Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67, 72 (E.D. Va. 1980).  See 
also Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (setting maximum statutory damage awards 
in cases “where the infringer shall show that he was not aware that he was infringing, and that 
such infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen”). 
69. For examples in which the court required actual knowledge, see Fitzgerald Publ’g 
Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986), and Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc., 
638 F. Supp. 983, 986 (E.D. Pa. 1986).  See also Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 
F.3d 183, 196 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that the defendant’s reckless disregard for the possibility 
of infringement constituted willfulness). 
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The “willfulness” of the defendant’s infringements is a factor that is 
integral to courts’ computation of statutory damage awards because 
deterrence is one of the main goals of copyright law.70  The deterrence 
rationale “focuses on the inequity of permitting the defendant to keep 
his gains, rather than on the concept that the gains belong to the 
plaintiff.”71  Courts consider a number of factors in connection with the 
deterrence rationale, including “the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct; the extent of the defendant’s contribution in the exploitation of 
the property; the importance of the property right the defendant 
appropriated; and justifications for granting the plaintiff a windfall in 
the amount recovered.”72 
For example, in the 1980 case Hospital for Sick Children v. Melody 
Fare Dinner Theatre,73 the plaintiffs, owners of the copyright for the play 
“Peter Pan or The Boy Who Would Not Grow Up,” claimed that the 
defendants’ play, entitled “Peter Pan, The Magical Musical,” infringed 
their copyright.74  The court considered the defendants’ gross profits and 
the willfulness of the defendants’ actions when it awarded the plaintiffs 
fifty dollars for each of the fifty performances, for a total statutory 
damage award of $10,000.75  In determining that the infringement had 
been committed willfully by the defendant author of the infringing 
musical, the court considered that she had written the musical, directed 
its performance, applied for its copyright, and obtained licenses to 
perform other musicals in the past.76  “Willfulness” is such an integral 
factor in the computation of statutory damage awards that it has 
survived the abolition of the multiplicity doctrine and is still used by 
post–1976 courts. 
B.  The “Infringed” Work Interpretation Under the 1909 Act 
Not all cases decided under the 1909 Act favored the plaintiffs by 
awarding multiple statutory damage awards under the multiplicity 
doctrine.  Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co.77 in 1966 was the first 
case with binding precedent on the issue of whether a network telecast 
 
70. See Andrew W. Coleman, Copyright Damages and the Value of the Infringing Use:  
Restitutionary Recovery in Copyright Infringement Actions, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 91, 104–05 (1993). 
71. Id. at 104. 
72. Id. 
73. 516 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
74. Id. at 68–69. 
75. Id. at 72–73. 
76. Id. at 72, 74. 
77. 249 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
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over multiple stations constituted multiple infringements.78  The court 
ultimately held that the telecast by 162 stations of an infringed television 
program constituted a single infringement by the defendants, not 162 
separate infringements.79  However, the court was influenced by the 
absence of a ceiling on the statutory amount that it could award for 
willful infringement in cases when notice was given, holding that it was 
unnecessary to apply a rigid multiple infringement rule, which may 
result in liability for innocent infringers who did not know that they had 
infringed a copyright.80  The Davis court held that the plaintiff had given 
the defendants the proper requisite notice and awarded the plaintiff 
$25,000 in statutory damages for one infringed work.81 
The Davis decision had a tremendous impact on the broadcasting 
industry.82  No longer could network broadcasters be liable for multiple 
infringements of a copyrighted work resulting from a single, 
simultaneous telecast.83  In addition, the motion picture industry 
recognized that the logical extension of the Davis case was to apply this 
rationale to multiple showings of an infringed motion picture.84  While 
 
78. Id. at 338. 
79. Id. at 349. 
80. Id. at 341 (stating that “if such notice has been given, a multiplication of 
infringements to pile up high minimum statutory damages and (by hypothesis) a more 
equitable damage figure is not necessary because the court is not bound by the maximum of 
$5,000”). 
81. Id. at 349. 
82. See Thea, supra note 4, at 486 (noting that the Davis case “quashed the fears within 
the broadcasting industry. . . . [because] network broadcasts would not support a claim for 
multiple infringement of a copyrighted work”). 
83. Davis, 249 F. Supp. at 342–43.  The court offered the following explanation: 
On balance, it seems preferable, for the purpose of applying the statutory damage 
provisions, to regard the simultaneous network telecast here as one infringement by 
the network and these co-defendants, rather than many.  This preserves flexibility, 
avoids the possibility of a ridiculous and injurious award in other cases and is the 
result at least suggested by the cases and the statute. 
Id. 
84. A representative of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. stated the 
following: 
[W]here production of a motion picture or a network radio or TV broadcast 
infringes a copyrighted work, there should be reasonable limitation on statutory 
damage liability for the multiple infringements inevitably flowing from the original 
infringement when the motion picture is infringingly exhibited in each of thousands 
of theatres, or the broadcast is infringingly relayed by each station in the network. 
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON 
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. 
COPYRIGHT LAW (PART 2) 365 (Comm. Print 1963) (statement of Edward A. Sargoy, 
Counsel to the Copyright Committee of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.). 
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most post–1976 courts have followed this decision and awarded 
statutory damage awards for each infringed work, they have focused on 
different factors discussed below in Part IV. 
IV.  THE “INFRINGED” WORK INTERPRETATION UNDER THE 1976 ACT 
The 1976 Act shifted the focus of statutory damage awards from the 
number of infringing works to the number of infringed works.85  
Although the 1976 Act did not define the word “work,” several courts 
have held that a distinct “work” must be able to live its own copyright 
life.86  This interpretation focuses on whether each infringed copyright 
has “independent economic value.”87  In addition, post–1976 courts still 
consider the “willfulness” of the defendant’s infringement.88 
A.  Independent Economic Value Test 
Several courts have addressed the question of whether each episode 
of a television series constitutes a separate work under § 504(c)(1).89  
Most have answered this question in the affirmative, holding that each 
episode of a television series has independent economic value.90 
For example, in the 1993 case Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-
Chea,91 the court considered whether four individual episodes of a 
television series constituted four separate works or a single work for 
 
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000); Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; see 
also Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 996 F.2d 1366, 1381 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that 
the 1976 Act “shifts the unit of damages inquiry from number of infringements to number of 
works”). 
86. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 
F.3d 284, 288 (9th Cir. 1997); MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d 766, 769 (11th Cir. 
1996); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 136 (5th Cir. 1992); Gamma Audio & 
Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc., 996 F.2d 
at 1380–81; Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Robert Stigwood 
Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1976); Phillips v. Kidsoft, L.L.C., 52 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (D. Md. 1999). 
87. See Columbia Pictures Television, 106 F.3d at 288; MCA Television Ltd., 89 F.3d at 
769; Mason, 967 F.2d at 136; Gamma Audio & Video, Inc., 11 F.3d at 1116; Twin Peaks 
Prods., Inc., 996 F.2d at 1380–81; Walt Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 567; O’Reilly, 530 F.2d at 1105; 
Phillips, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
88. See, e.g., Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862–63 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United Feature Syndicate, 
Inc. v. Spree, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. 
Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
89. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television, 106 F.3d at 295; Gamma Audio & Video, 
Inc., 11 F.3d at 1116–17; Twin Peaks Prods., Inc., 996 F.2d at 1380–81. 
90. See sources cited supra note 89. 
91. 11 F.3d 1106 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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purposes of awarding statutory damages.92  The district court held that 
the four individual episodes constituted a single work because the 
copyright holder sold or rented only complete sets of the series to video 
stores and because the copyrights for the four episodes were all 
registered on one form.93  The First Circuit disagreed, however, holding 
that each episode constituted a separate work and that the plaintiff was 
entitled to four separate statutory damages awards.94  In its decision, the 
court emphasized that each episode of the series was independently 
produced and independently aired on television.95 
Similarly, in the 1997 case Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton 
Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc.,96 the Ninth Circuit held that each 
infringed episode of a television series constituted a separate work 
where “different episodes were broadcast over the course of weeks, 
months, and years.”97  “[T]he episodes could be repeated and broadcast 
in different orders [and were] separately written, produced, and 
registered.”98  Thus, the court held that each episode of the series had 
independent economic value.99  Finally, in the 1996 case MCA Television 
Ltd. v. Feltner,100 the court upheld one of the largest judgments ever for 
statutory damages against a copyright infringer:  $9 million.101  The 
defendant argued that the court should award damages for each series 
broadcast, as opposed to each episode, and that “industry practice” was 
to enter into contracts for a television series, not the individual episodes 
of a series.102  Thus, the defendant argued, an individual episode of a 
series does not have independent economic value and is not a separate 
work.103  The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, however, and awarded 
damages for each episode of a series broadcast as a separate “work,” 
 
92. Id. at 1115. 
93. Id. at 1117. 
94. Id. at 1118.  The court found significant “the fact that (1) viewers who rent the 
tapes from their local video stores may rent as few or as many tapes as they want, many view 
one, two, or twenty episodes in a single setting, and may never watch or rent all of the 
episodes; and (2) each episode in the . . . series was separately produced.”  Id. at 1117. 
95. Id. at 1117–18. 
96. 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997). 
97. See id. at 295.  The licensed television series at issue in this case include “Who’s the 
Boss?,” “Silver Spoons,” “Hart to Hart,” and “T.J. Hooker.”  Id. at 288. 
98. Id. at 295. 
99. Id. 
100. 89 F.3d 766 (11th Cir. 1996). 
101. Id. at 771. 
102. Id. at 769. 
103. Id. 
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holding that the copyright owners’ “decision . . . to sell television series 
as a block, rather than as individual shows, in no way indicates that each 
episode in a series is unable to stand alone.”104 
By contrast, in several cases involving multiple infringements of a 
copyrighted work, courts have held that each work did not have 
independent economic value.105  For example, in the 1990 case Walt 
Disney Co. v. Powell,106 the D.C. Circuit held that the defendant, a 
souvenir business owner, had infringed two copyrights of Mickey and 
Minnie Mouse in six different poses, as opposed to twelve copyrights in 
twelve different poses.107  The court held that although Mickey and 
Minnie are “distinct, viable works with separate economic value and 
copyright lives of their own,” the six different poses are not.108  The court 
further held that both the text of the 1976 Act and the Act’s legislative 
history make it clear that damages should be awarded for a single work 
regardless of how many acts of infringement are involved in the 
action.109 
Similarly, in the 1999 case Phillips v. Kidsoft, L.L.C.,110 the plaintiff 
argued that the defendant should pay statutory damages for each of the 
thirty infringed mazes copied from the plaintiff’s five maze books.111  On 
the one hand, if each of the thirty mazes copied by the defendant 
qualified as a “work,” the plaintiff would be entitled to thirty separate 
statutory damage awards.112  On the other hand, if each of the five maze 
books qualified as a “work,” the plaintiff would be entitled to only five 
statutory damage awards.113  The court acknowledged that each maze 
would qualify as a separate “work” under § 504(c)(1) only if each maze 
were separately copyrighted and had “independent economic value.”114  
However, it was irrelevant in this particular case whether the copied 
 
104. Id. 
105. See, e.g., Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 136–41 (5th Cir. 1992); 
Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Phillips v. Kidsoft, L.L.C., 52 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102, 1106 (D. Md. 1999). 
106. 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
107. Id. at 567, 570. 
108. Id. at 570 (noting that “Mickey is still Mickey whether he is smiling or frowning, 
running or walking, waving his left hand or his right”).  Thus, the court held that the 
defendant’s mouse face shirts had infringed only two of Disney’s works.  Id. 
109. Id. at 569. 
110. 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1102 (D. Md. 1999). 
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mazes had separate economic value because they were not individually 
copyrighted.115  Thus, the court awarded the plaintiff statutory damages 
based on the five maze books.116 
Finally, in the 1992 case Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc.,117 the Fifth 
Circuit held that the plaintiff could not recover statutory damages for 
each of the 233 infringing real estate ownership maps.118  Instead, the 
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to statutory damages for only 
one copyrighted work because each of the 233 real estate maps did not 
have independent economic value.119  In addition, the court offered this 
hypothetical example to illustrate the effect of § 504(c)(1): 
So if a plaintiff proves that one defendant committed five 
separate infringements of one copyrighted work, that plaintiff is 
entitled to only one award of statutory damages ranging from 
$500 to $20,000.  And if a plaintiff proves that two different 
defendants each committed five separate infringements of five 
different works, the plaintiff is entitled to ten awards, not fifty.120 
Thus, courts that have considered the independent economic value 
of a work have consistently held that statutory damage awards should 
be based on the number of infringed works.121  In addition, many courts 
that have considered the “willfulness” of the defendant’s infringements 
have also held that statutory damage awards should be based on the 
number of infringed works.122 
B.  “Willfulness” of the Defendant’s Infringements . . . Revisited 
Just as pre–1976 courts considered the “willfulness” of the 
defendant’s infringements as a significant factor in computing statutory 
 
115. Id.  The copyright registration certificates issued to the plaintiff in this case were 
issued only for the five maze books, not the individual mazes.  Id. 
116. Id. at 1107. 
117. 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992). 
118. Id. at 136. 
119. See id. at 144. 
120. Id. at 143–44. 
121. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 
106 F.3d 284, 288 (9th Cir. 1997); MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d 766, 769 (11th Cir. 
1996); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 996 F.2d 1366, 1380–81 (2d Cir. 1993); Gamma 
Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993); Mason, 967 F.2d at 136; 
Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. 
v. O’Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1976); Phillips v. Kidsoft, L.L.C., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1102, 1106 (D. Md. 1999). 
122. See, e.g., Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 
1990); RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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damage awards, so too do post–1976 courts.123  The 1976 Act has 
interpreted “willful” to mean “with knowledge that the defendant’s 
conduct constitutes copyright infringement.”124  To rebut evidence of 
willful infringement, a defendant “must not only establish its good faith 
belief in the innocence of its conduct, it must also show that it was 
reasonable in holding such a belief.”125  In copyright infringement cases 
in which the defendant blatantly infringed or committed multiple 
infringements, courts have awarded plaintiffs more than the statutory 
maximum.126 
For example, in the 1984 case RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri,127 the court 
interpreted the language of § 504(c)(1) as prohibiting plaintiffs from 
recovering multiple statutory damage awards for both the infringing 
graphics for a recording and the actual recording itself.128  Nor could 
plaintiffs recover separate statutory damage awards for both infringing 
tapes and records.129  However, as a result of the willfulness of the 
defendant’s infringements, the court awarded the then-maximum 
statutory damage award of $50,000 for each infringement.130  Thus, the 
total statutory damage award as a result of the defendant’s willful 
infringements was $1.45 million.131  Similarly, in the 1990 case Peer 
International Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc.,132 the Ninth Circuit held that 
the defendant’s conduct of ignoring the plaintiff’s revocation of a license 
 
123. See supra Part III.C.3 for a discussion of pre–1976 courts’ treatment of the 
“willfulness” factor. 
124. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 14.04[B][3]; see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) 
(2000) (stating that “[i]n a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, 
and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may 
increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000”). 
125. Peer Int’l Corp., 909 F.2d at 1336. 
126. See, e.g., id. (court awarded $50,000 for each infringed work for a total of $4 
million); RSO Records, Inc., 596 F. Supp. at 862–63 (court awarded $50,000 for each infringed 
sound recording but not for both the sound recording and the graphic for the sound 
recording); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Spree, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (E.D. Mich. 
1984) (court awarded $50,000 for each infringed t-shirt heat transfer); Lauratex Textile Corp. 
v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court awarded statutory 
damages of $40,000 when actual damages were only $5000). 
127. 596 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
128. Id. at 862 n.16. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 862–63.  The 1976 Act originally provided for a maximum amount of $50,000 
in statutory damage awards in the event that the defendant willfully infringed; however, this 
amount was amended to $100,000 on October 31, 1988, under § 13 and to $150,000 on 
December 9, 1999, under § 4. 
131. Id. at 863. 
132. Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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was unreasonable, and its further use of the copyrighted works was 
willful.133  Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s then-maximum 
statutory damage award of $50,000 for each of the eighty infringed 
works for a total of $4 million in damages based on the willfulness of the 
defendant’s infringements.134  Although both of the courts in the above-
mentioned cases awarded large statutory damage awards as a result of 
the defendants’ willful conduct in an effort to deter prospective 
infringers, the court in Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records failed to 
do so, as discussed below in Part V. 
V.  THE MULTIPLICITY DOCTRINE:  FURTHERING THE GOALS OF 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
In the 2004 case Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records,135 the 
plaintiffs, children and heirs of the famous Puerto Rican composer 
Guillermo Venegas-Lloveras, filed a copyright infringement action 
against Sonolux Records, a United States recording company.136  The 
plaintiffs had inherited the copyrights to 197 of Venegas-Lloveras’ 
songs.137  “Sonolux had published recordings of two of the copyrighted 
songs . . . on sixteen different albums . . . .”138  The plaintiffs claimed that 
they were entitled to statutory damages multiplied by the number of 
albums (sixteen) containing the infringed songs.139 
The district court awarded the plaintiffs $1.6 million in statutory 
damages for the infringement of the two songs on sixteen different 
albums, that is, $100,000 for each album.140  On appeal, however, the 
First Circuit found the damages calculation to have been made in error 
and followed the recent trend among courts of abolishing the 
multiplicity doctrine.141  Interpreting the word “work” in the 1976 Act to 
mean infringed works (two), the court reduced the statutory damages 
award from $1.6 million to $200,000, that is, $100,000 for each song.142 
 
133. Id. at 1336. 
134. Id. 
135. 370 F.3d 183, 185 (1st Cir. 2004). 
136. Id. at 185. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 185–86.  The two copyrighted songs that Sonolux published were “Desde 
Que Te Marchaste” (“Since You Went Away”) and “No Me Digan Cobarde” (“Don’t Call 
Me a Coward”).  Id. at 186 & n.1. 
139. Plaintiffs in this case brought claims for statutory damages, rather than actual 
damages, and for defendant’s profits for all sixteen albums.  Id. at 186. 
140. Id. at 186. 
141. Id. at 194–95. 
142. Id. at 195.  In addition, the First Circuit held that “‘works’ in § 504(c)(1) means 
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The ruling in the Venegas-Hernandez case illustrates two problems 
with the abolition of the multiplicity doctrine.  First, the outcome does 
not further one of the main goals of copyright law—the deterrence of 
prospective infringers.143  After reversing the district court, the First 
Circuit did not simply remand the case with instructions to enter the 
$200,000 award as judgment.144  Instead, it acknowledged that the 1976 
Act was designed to deter willful infringement by using the “sliding 
scale” of statutory damages and noted the possibility that on remand the 
judge may award the statutory maximum of $150,000 per song.145  The 
court appeared to rely on the “sliding scale” of statutory damages as a 
justification for substantially reducing the statutory damage award.146  
By doing so, the court dismissed any concerns that the amount of 
statutory damages may not actually deter potential infringers and 
further one of the main goals of the 1976 Act.147  Assuming that on 
remand, the court did award the statutory maximum of $150,000 for 
each infringed song for a total of $300,000, would this amount really 
deter potential infringers?  The answer depends on the amount of 
revenue the infringers received from the infringement, that is, whether it 
is financially “worth it” to infringe.  In this case, just one of the sixteen 
records that contained infringed songs sold over five million copies.148  
Forcing Sonolux to pay $200,000 or even $300,000 for producing a 
record that presumably made over $50 million is not likely to have the 
deterrent effect that the 1976 Act intended. 
The second problem with the court’s decision in Venegas-Hernandez 
is that it fails to address the potential judicial economy issue that may 
 
‘songs’ in the context of this case.”  Id. at 194. 
143. See Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, L.L.C., No. Civ. A.03-4962, 2005 WL 
67077, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2005) (“Statutory damages serve the dual purpose of 
compensation and deterrence:  they compensate the plaintiff for the infringement of its 
copyright; and they deter future infringements by punishing the defendant for its actions.”). 
144. See Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 194–95. 
145. Id. at 195.  The court stated the following: 
At the $100,000 per “work” rate set by the original judge, the corrected calculation 
would automatically produce a reduction in the judgment to $200,000.  However, it 
may be that the first judge would have increased the amount of damages per work, 
given the number of infringements and given his finding of willfulness, if he had 
understood that “works” referred to the infringed songs rather than the infringing 
albums. 
Id. 
146. See id. 
147. See supra Parts III.A.3, IV.B. 
148. See Rafael Venegas, RIAA Lawsuits—RIAA Behavior,  
http://www.p2pnet.net/article/8070 (last visited Sept. 30, 2005). 
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occur when plaintiffs discover that their only option to achieve multiple 
statutory damage awards is to file multiple lawsuits.  In fact, the First 
Circuit acknowledged the potential problem of “game-playing” that 
may result from its interpretation of § 504(c)(1) as well as various 
possible solutions to that problem.149  However, it stated that the 
problem was “beyond the scope of this opinion”150 and summarily 
dismissed it.  These two problems with the court’s decision in Venegas-
Hernandez illustrate the two advantages of the multiplicity doctrine:  
First, it furthers the deterrence goal of copyright law; and second, it 
promotes good public policy. 
A.  The Multiplicity Doctrine Furthers the Deterrence Goal of Copyright 
Law 
The United States Constitution grants Congress the authority to 
enact laws “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”151  When a copyright 
owner’s “exclusive right” has been infringed, federal law allows for 
damages for the purpose of deterring future acts of infringement.152  
Although the 1976 Act allows for a copyright owner to recover actual 
damages from the infringements, Congress has acknowledged that 
plaintiffs and courts often have difficulty determining the amount of 
actual damages.153  Thus, statutory damages are an alternative way not 
 
149. See Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 193. 
150. Id. at 194. 
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
152. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000). 
153. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 
102–03 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961 REPORT]. 
The need for this special remedy arises from the acknowledged inadequacy of actual 
damages and profits in many cases: 
•  The value of a copyright is, by its nature, difficult to establish, and the loss caused 
by an infringement is equally hard to determine.  As a result, actual damages are 
often conjectural, and may be impossible or prohibitively expensive to prove. 
•  In many cases, especially those involving public performances, the only direct loss 
that could be proven is the amount of a license fee.  An award of such an amount 
would be an invitation to infringe with no rise of loss to the infringer. 
•  The actual damages capable of proof are often less than the cost to the copyright 
owner of detecting and investigating infringements. 
•  An award of the infringer’s profits would often be equally inadequate.  There may 
have been little or no profit, or it may be impossible to compute the amount of 
profits attributable to the infringement.  Frequently, the infringer’s profits will not 
be an adequate measure of the injury caused to the copyright owner. 
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only to compensate the copyright owner for lost profits and 
unascertainable actual damages, but also to deter future willful 
infringements.154 
The court in Venegas-Hernandez acknowledged that the 1976 Act 
was designed to deter willful infringements.155  In addition, the First 
Circuit noted that the district court had concluded that the 
infringements were willful and that Sonolux’s conduct “demonstrat[ed] 
a continuing disregard for the law.”156  However, the court went on to 
discuss the “sliding scale” of statutory damages and implied that a 
maximum damage award of $150,000 per song (for willful infringement) 
would likely deter Sonolux and other potential infringers.157 
When a prospective infringer realizes that the damages he or she 
would be liable for are limited to one maximum statutory award, he or 
she may be more willing to take the risk of getting caught for infringing 
the work.  In essence, infringers can use a “cost-benefit analysis and 
determine whether infringing will be profitable even if they are 
caught.”158  Assuming that on remand, the court awards the statutory 
maximum of $150,000 for each infringed song for a total of $300,000, is 
this amount likely to deter Sonolux or other prospective infringers?  I 
would argue that the answer to this question is “no.”159 
 
Id. 
154. See Yurman Design, Inc. v. P.A.J., Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[S]tatutory damages are not meant to be merely compensatory or restitutionary.  The 
statutory award is also meant ‘to discourage wrongful conduct.’  That is why the statute 
permits consideration of . . . additional damages where an infringement is willful.” (internal 
citations omitted)); see also 1961 REPORT, supra note 153, at 103 (noting that statutory 
damages were intended “(1) to assure adequate compensation to the copyright owner for his 
injury, and (2) to deter infringement”). 
155. See Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 195. 
156. Id. at 196. 
157. Id. at 195–96.  The court also stated that the district court’s intent is unclear from 
the first order: 
That language may well mean that the first judge was primarily concerned with the 
total damages, the $1,600,000, as the sum that would reflect a just award in light of 
defendant’s willfulness and would discourage future infringement.  Because the 
intent of the original order is not clear, we think on remand plaintiffs should be free 
to argue to the district court that the statutory cap of $150,000 per song, in light of 
seventeen infringing works (including the album “Sentimientos”) and the willful 
conduct.  The $200,000 award will serve as a damages floor on remand. 
Id. at 196. 
158. Thea, supra note 4, at 489.  For example, if a large corporation such as Sonolux 
will make a $50 million profit on an album that contains two infringed songs, the benefit 
outweighs the cost of $300,000 in statutory damages ($150,000 per song). 
159. Rafael Venegas would likely agree that this amount is unlikely to deter a large 
corporation such as Sonolux.  As he has pointed out, Sonolux is a member of the Recording 
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Suppose, in a hypothetical example, that a “starving” artist’s 
painting was infringed by a national art gallery.  The gallery displayed 
the painting at six different exhibits across the country.  What amount of 
statutory damages would the artist be entitled to under the multiplicity 
doctrine versus the post–1976 infringed work interpretation? 
Assume that the national gallery has locations in over twenty-five 
cities and has gross profits of approximately $10 million per year.  
Further, assume that the six galleries that displayed the starving artist’s 
painting at different exhibits did so five months apart.  Finally, assume 
that the gallery was well aware that it was, in fact, infringing the artist’s 
painting.  Under the multiplicity doctrine, a court would likely consider 
the gross profits ($10 million per year) and the size of the gallery 
(twenty-five locations across the nation) and award a larger statutory 
damage award than it would if the gallery was local and barely made a 
profit each year. 160  A court would also likely consider the proximity in 
time of the repeated infringements and the heterogeneity of the 
infringements under the multiplicity doctrine.161  Because the 
infringements occurred in separate cities five months apart, a court 
would likely award damages for each of the six exhibits.  Finally, a court 
would consider the “willfulness” of the infringements under the 
multiplicity doctrine.162  Assuming that the judge finds the gallery’s 
infringements to be “willful,” a court would likely award the starving 
artist the maximum statutory damage award of $150,000 for each 
infringing work, that is, $900,000.  I would argue that this amount is 
large enough to deter the gallery from further infringing activity in 
accordance with the deterrence goal of copyright law. 
Now assume that the same hypothetical example occurs in a 
jurisdiction that has abolished the multiplicity doctrine.  Under the 
independent economic value test, a court is not likely to find that each 
of the six exhibits that displayed the painting can live its own copyright 
life.163  Thus, assuming that a court finds the gallery’s infringements 
willful, the maximum amount of statutory damages it could award is 
 
Industry Association of America (RIAA), an organization that has filed several lawsuits 
against people for downloading and sharing songs for which they could be liable for up to 
$150,000 per song.  He asks:  “[W]hy would any judge give RIAA an award of $150,000 
against a kid (or the parent) for downloading or sharing a single song when a major record 
label/corporation has to pay only $12,500 for making a record that sold over 5 million 
copies?”  Venegas, supra note 148. 
160. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
161. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
162. See discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
163. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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$150,000.164  Not only is a maximum potential statutory damage award of 
$150,000 not likely to deter the gallery from infringing the starving 
artist’s or other artists’ paintings in the future, it is also unlikely that the 
artist would be able to find a lawyer willing to take a case that would 
likely cost up to $100,000 to litigate.  Thus, while the result under the 
multiplicity doctrine furthers the deterrence goal of copyright law, the 
result in a jurisdiction that has abolished the multiplicity doctrine fails to 
do so and may leave the copyright owner without the resources to 
pursue an action against the infringer. 
B.  The Multiplicity Doctrine Promotes Good Public Policy 
How, then, can copyright owners in jurisdictions that have abolished 
the multiplicity doctrine, such as the plaintiffs in Venegas-Hernandez, 
receive multiple statutory damage awards?  Professor Nimmer has 
cautioned that the only option seems to be that plaintiffs must file 
separate actions for each claim of infringement to any one work.165  This 
option would be wasteful in the interests of judicial economy, and courts 
are likely to interpret the 1976 Act in such a manner as to reduce the 
number of infringement actions that plaintiffs may bring.166  The court in 
Venegas-Hernandez acknowledged and dismissed Professor Nimmer’s 
concerns about the potential filing of multiple lawsuits to receive 
multiple statutory damage awards that could occur as a result of the 
abolition of the multiplicity doctrine.167  Instead, the court relied on 
Professor Goldstein’s assertion that the strategy of filing multiple 
lawsuits to receive multiple statutory damage awards would be “both 
procedurally and practically implausible”:168 
 [I]n the ordinary case involving a continuing infringement, 
the copyright owner will want to seek temporary and final 
injunctive relief; if the copyright owner prevails, this will forestall 
any future infringements and will circumscribe the copyright 
owner’s statutory damage award by all infringements occurring 
before the injunction entered.  In any event, the rare copyright 
 
164. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
165. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 14.04[E][2][c].  “It may be wondered 
whether the courts will require a plaintiff to undertake the charade of filing separate actions 
(based upon separate infringing transactions) in order to achieve multiple statutory 
damages.”  Id. 
166. See id. at n.164.1 (providing examples of courts construing the Copyright Act in 
such a manner as to reduce the number of infringement actions that need to be brought). 
167. See Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 193–94 (1st Cir. 2004). 
168. Id. at 194 n.9 (quoting 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 12.2.2.2(a) (2d ed. 
2003)). 
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owner who pursues this route should expect to receive a smaller 
statutory award in its successive actions that if it sought to 
recover for these infringements in a single action.169 
However, the “rare copyright owner” who does go through the 
charade of filing multiple lawsuits to receive multiple statutory damage 
awards is still wasting the valuable and increasingly scarce resources of 
the courts.  Reinstating the multiplicity doctrine would put an end to 
this waste and promote good public policy. 
Furthermore, the multiplicity doctrine promotes good public policy 
because it does not result in exorbitant damages awards.  Pre–1976, the 
biggest critics of the multiplicity doctrine were the users of copyrighted 
material, such as the radio, television, advertising and motion picture 
industries, who feared that they would be hit with multimillion-dollar 
statutory damages awards.170  This has not proven to be true, however, as 
courts that have elected to use the multiplicity doctrine post–1976 have 
taken special care not to award exorbitant damages.171  For example, in 
Blackman v. Hustler Magazine,172 the court held that the defendant’s 
three successive publications of a group of copyrighted photographs 
constituted three separate infringements, noting that an award based on 
one dollar per copy of the magazine would result in a multi-million 
dollar recovery for the plaintiff that would be “excessive.”173  Thus, post–
1976 courts that have used the multiplicity doctrine to award statutory 
damages have done so with an amount large enough only to deter the 
defendants from further infringement, not bankrupt them. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Comment is to illustrate the effects of the 
abolition of the multiplicity doctrine on the deterrence goal of copyright 
law in cases concerning multiple infringements of a copyrighted work.  
Courts’ interpretations of the word “work” can result in substantial 
differences in the amount of statutory damages awards—differences 
that may influence prospective infringers to either continue or refrain 
from future infringement.  Prospective infringers who engage in a cost-
benefit analysis are likely to find that, under current law, the benefits of 
 
169. Id. 
170. See 1961 REPORT, supra note 153, at 104. 
171. See, e.g., Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, 620 F. Supp. 792, 800 (D.D.C. 1985), 
rev’d on other grounds, 800 F.2d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
172. 620 F. Supp. at 792. 
173. Id. at 800. 
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infringing outweigh the costs. 
To further the deterrence goal of copyright law, courts should return 
to the infringing work interpretation under the multiplicity doctrine and 
consider the gross profits and size of the infringer’s business, the time 
and heterogeneity of the infringements, and the willfulness of the 
defendant’s conduct as factors in computing statutory damage awards.  
Under the multiplicity doctrine, larger statutory damage awards are 
likely to result when necessary to deter prospective infringement, that is, 
a case in which a large corporation has made a substantial amount of 
money from the infringements and has no other incentive not to 
infringe.  Thus, copyright law will once again serve to protect copyright 
owners’ exclusive rights to their works in accordance with the United 
States Constitution. 
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